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Abstract 
Micro- and small firms lack access to external finance and the labour 
market so that they are vulnerable to family hardships experienced by the 
owners such as deaths or sickness of family members. The literature is 
thin on how these firms cope with family hardships, in particular on 
whether owners’ access to social health insurance helps. We examine 
whether a social health insurance in Indonesia, Askeskin, protects owners 
of micro- and small firms against family hardships. We find some 
evidence Askeskin reduces the adverse effects of recent deaths in the 
family, outpatient care, and traffic accidents on net profits; Askeskin also 
protects the firms’ assets against owners’ outpatient care need. Social 
health insurance may, therefore, improve micro- and small firms’ survival, 
which (because most people in developing countries’ labour markets work 
in micro- and small firms) helps governments’ efforts to eradicate poverty.  
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1. Introduction 
Most micro- and small firms in developing countries employ family workers and lack 
access to formal credits, which make them vulnerable to family hardships experienced 
by the owners: Family hardships may shrink the firms’ assets and pool of family 
workers (Gertler & Gruber, 2002; Wagstaff, 2007). The literature on the mechanisms 
finds, to cope with hardships, households in developing countries sell household- or 
productive assets (Alam & Mahal, 2016; Mahal, Karan, Fan, & Engelgau, 2013; Mitra, 
Palmer, Mont, & Groce, 2016), pull children out of school (Mitra et al., 2016; 
Yamauchi, Buthelezi, & Velia, 2008), withdraw savings (Wagstaff & Lindelow, 2014), 
borrow money or work less (Khan, Bedi, & Sparrow, 2015), and cut consumption 
(Beegle, De Weerdt, & Dercon, 2007; Wagstaff, 2007).  
How micro- and small firms cope with family hardships such as deaths or 
sickness in the family is an important research question that the literature seems to 
ignore and to which this paper contributes, in particular on whether owners’ access to 
health insurance helps. We examine whether a social health insurance in Indonesia, 
Askeskin (Asuransi Kesehatan untuk Masyarakat Miskin, Health Insurance for the Poor) 
that the government introduced in 2005, helps micro- and small firms recover from 
family hardships experienced by the owners. Specifically, we investigate whether being 
an Askeskin recipient, through its interaction with family hardships, affects the 
performance of micro- and small firms.  
The internal finance theory of growth suggests that small firms’ growth 
primarily depends on internal finance, but the correlation weakens if external financial 
constraints are less binding (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Pál & Kozhan, 2009). 
However, small firms rarely use credits because of imperfect capital markets, 
complicated banking procedures, and lack of collateral (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
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Maksimovic, 2005; Demirgüç-Kunt & Klapper, 2012; Gertler, 1988; Gertler & 
Hubbard, 1988; Hubbard & Kashyap, 1990; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Governments can 
alleviate the problem through subsidies (Hyytinen & Toivanen, 2005) and institutional 
development (Beck, et al., 2005, 2008; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, & Maksimovic, 
2006); or micro- and small firms may generate funds internally through exports and 
foreign ownerships (Bridges & Guariglia, 2008), more efficient production (Guariglia, 
Liu, & Song 2011), and cost cutting (Musso & Schiavo, 2008). Another possible 
solution is giving the poor access to social health insurance.  
Social health insurance like Askeskin may affect micro- and small firms in two 
ways: It may increase owners’ and family workers’ productivity (because they have 
better access to healthcare services and, therefore, are healthier), and it may reduce 
owners’ healthcare expenses. The literature on social health insurance suggests insured 
households incur lower medical expenses (Levine, Polimeni, & Ramage, 2016; 
Wagstaff, 2010), have better health (Wang, Yip, Zhang, & Hsiao, 2009), and use 
healthcare services more often (Gruber, Hendren, & Townsend, 2014; Wagstaff & 
Prahan, 2005). However, some papers find social health insurance may not always 
work: Although social health insurance reduces financial risk, it does not affect health 
outcomes (Barros, 2008) or healthcare utilisation (Nguyen, 2016; Thornton, Hatt, Field, 
Islam, Freddy, & González, 2010; Wagstaff, 2010); others find higher healthcare 
utilisation may correlate with higher healthcare expenses (Wagstaff, Lindelow, Jun, 
Ling, & Qian, 2009; Palmer, Mitra, Mont, & Groce, 2015).    
To examine whether social health insurance helps owners of micro- and small 
firms withstand family hardships, we use data on micro- and small firms in the fourth 
wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS-4) that the RAND Corporation did in 
2007. The sample includes 5,900 micro- and small firms in non-farm sector in 
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Indonesia. We use firm- and household-modules in the survey to create measures of 
firm performances (such as assets and net profits) and family hardships (such as deaths 
or sickness in the family and having outpatient care or accidents). We also include firm- 
and household characteristics that may correlate with family hardships, being an 
Askeskin recipient, and firm performance as control variables, including information 
that the government used to select Askeskin recipients.  
We find some evidence Askeskin helps owners of micro- and small firms 
withstand family hardships: Askeskin reduces the adverse effects of deaths in the family 
in the previous year, outpatient care, and traffic accidents on net profits; we also find 
Askeskin protects firms’ assets against owners’ outpatient care need. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first that examines whether social 
health insurance helps micro- and small firms withstand family hardships experienced 
by the owners. The literature on internal finance suggests good governance and 
subsidies weaken the impact of internal funds on small firms (Beck et al., 2005, 2006, 
2008; Beck et al., 2006; Hyytinen & Toivanen, 2005), but discusses little about whether 
health insurance helps micro- and small firms recover from family hardships. We also 
add to the literature on policies whose objective is to improve micro- and small firms’ 
financial access and viability in developing countries. Several papers find microfinance 
and microinsurance have little impact on the poor (Banerjee, Duflo, & Hornbek, 2014; 
Cole et al., 2013; Rooyen, Stewart, & de Wet, 2012) and firms’ profits and growth 
(Angelucci, Karlan, & Zinman, 2015; Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, & Kinna, 2015; 
Crépon, Devota, Duflo, & Pariente, 2015). We contribute by studying social health 
insurance whose outreach is wider.  
In the next section, we discuss the Askeskin programme. Then we describe the 
empirical strategy and the data. We discuss the results and conclude. 
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2. The social health insurance in Indonesia—Askeskin  
When Indonesia introduced the National Social Security System (Law 40/2004) in 
2004, which stipulated the principles and goals of social security programmes reforms 
for universal coverage, only 28 per cent of the Indonesian were covered by formal 
insurance: 17 per cent by Askes, Asabri, and Taspen for the public sector, and 11 per 
cent by Jamsostek for the private sector (ILO, 2008; Mboi, 2015).1 About 67 per cent of 
the workers—most of them worked in informal sector—were uninsured. Even in the 
formal sector, less than half of the workers had social health insurance, many of which 
may lose their access to the insurance if they had to move to the informal sector because 
of an economic slow-down (ILO, 2008).   
 The government introduced the Askeskin programme in 2005 to cover those who 
were left out—the poor and workers in the informal sector. It covered 60 million people 
in 2005, which increased to 76.4 million in 2007 and 120 million in 2014. The 
government renamed the programme as Jamkesmas (Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat, 
Community Health Insurance) in 2008 to include the near-poor and then JKN (Jaminan 
Kesehatan National, National Health Insurance) in 2014 to integrate all state-owned 
health insurance schemes into a single scheme, making it one of the largest social health 
schemes in the world (WHO, 2015). Each Askeskin beneficiary was entitled a fully 
subsidised premium of Rp 5,000 per month (about $6 per year in 2005), which the 
central government financed through its budget from the energy subsidy reductions 
(Sparrow, Suryahadi, & Widyanti, 2013).2 
 The targeting process of Askeskin was varied across the Indonesian districts. 
BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik, Statistics Indonesia) identified recipients using a proxy 
means test with 14 household indicators, and each district would get a list of eligible 
recipients and quota.3 However, the district governments could do their own surveys 
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and draw up their own list of recipients. The targeting process identified eligible 
households, but the membership of Askeskin was individual—that is, each household 
member entitled to hold an Askeskin card. In the first year of the Askeskin programme, 
the JPS (Jaring Pengaman Social, Social Safety Net) health card and SKTM (Surat 
Keterangan Tidak Mampu, village poverty letters) were accepted to claim the insurance 
benefits (Arifianto, Marianti, Budiyati, & Tan, 2005; Harimurti, Pambudi, Pigazzini, & 
Tandon, 2013).  
 Under Askeskin, the government’s health insurance agency, PT Askes, was 
responsible for reimbursement of money to healthcare providers, which the Ministry of 
Health took over in 2008. PT Askes received money from the Ministry of Health 
annually and disbursed the funds to hospitals quarterly, and it charged ten per cent of 
the premiums for administrating and promoting Askeskin. The agent paid primary care 
services by capitation and reimbursed hospitals on a fee-for-service basis for both 
inpatient and outpatient care (World Bank, 2012).  
 In the first year of its implementation, Askeskin faced several challenges. First, 
targeting the poor and the non-poor was difficult. The programme suffered from 
considerable inclusion and exclusion errors; leakages to the non-poor were large and 
many of the poor were not captured (Sumarto & Bazzi, 2011). Second, the 
reimbursement process was inefficient. Askeskin funds were misallocated and the 
Ministry of Health had shortage of funds to reimburse hospitals in time. Some hospitals 
rejected serving the poor because their previous claims had not been paid (Thabrany, 
2008). Third, poor public information caused low utilisation of Askeskin card. Both 
recipients and healthcare providers were unclear about the procedures to beneficiaries, 
administrative procedures, and responsibilities for healthcare providers (Bachtiar, 
Wibisana, & Pujiyanto, 2006). Fourth, the access to basic primary care services was 
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unequal across Indonesia. Health workers, such as doctors and midwives, were 
unevenly distributed, and the problem was particularly pressing in remote rural areas 
(World Bank, 2008). Fifth, scepticism of the programme had left Askeskin card 
underutilised. Some recipients preferred not to use their cards to avoid perceived 
stigmatisation from healthcare providers and longer waiting times because of additional 
administrative requirements. Some also perceived Askeskin financed care as being 
inferior quality to that self-paying care (Harimurti et al., 2013).4  
 Some papers evaluate the Askeskin programme and find it improves access to 
healthcare services, increases healthcare utilisation, and reduce out-of-pocket healthcare 
expenditure among the poor. For example, Aji et al. (2013) find out-of-pocket 
healthcare expenditures for Askeskin recipients are 11-34 per cent lower than those of 
for non-recipients; Sparrow et al. (2013) find Askeskin increases outpatient care 
utilisation; and Quayyum et al. (2009) find Askeskin provides some degree of financial 
protection to households in the poorest quintiles in Serang and Pandeglang districts of 
Banten Province that incur catastrophic payments.    
 
3. Empirical strategy and data 
3.1. Empirical strategy 
We use the following regression to estimate the effects of Askeskin and family 
hardships on micro- and small firms’ performance 
  𝑦𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 𝜋𝐷𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖 (1) 
 
where  𝑦𝑖𝑗 is the assets (or net profits) of firm i owned by household j; 𝐷𝑖𝑗 is an 
indicator of whether household j of firm i is Askeskin insured; ℎ𝑖𝑗 is an indicator of 
whether household j of firm i experienced deaths of family members in the previous 
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year (family hardships); 𝐷𝑖𝑗ℎ𝑖𝑗  is the interaction between Askeskin and family 
hardships; 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is a vector of control variables (household-, firm-, and owner 
characteristics, and knowledge of health facilities that may correlate with whether an 
owner has Askeskin, whether she experienced family hardships and the assets of her 
firm); and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. We also include a set of district fixed effects and dummy 
variables for whether household j of firm i has other insurance schemes. We cluster the 
standard errors at the district level. 
 To make Askeskin household firms and those owned by non-Askeskin 
households more comparable, we control for observed characteristics available in the 
data that may correlate with Askeskin status, family hardships, or firm performance—all 
from the third wave of IFLS (past characteristics) to ensure that they are good control 
variables. First, we control for household characteristics, the indicators the government 
used in the proxy means test to select Askeskin recipients and other variables on 
households’ living conditions. Second, we include firm characteristics that may 
correlate with the variables of interest. For example, the number of (family) workers 
may affect the firms’ assets and the probability of the household experiences family 
hardships. Third, we also control for owners’ characteristics and households’ 
knowledge of healthcare facilities. Owners who have a bigger household and older 
owners, for example, are more likely to earn more and experience family hardships. 
Owners who know the location of the nearest healthcare facilities are more likely to 
enrol to Askeskin, be healthier (or less likely to experience family hardships) and run 
their firms better (because owners and family workers are healthier).   
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3.2 Data 
We use the data from the third and the fourth rounds of the Indonesian Family Life 
Survey (IFLS) that the RAND Corporation did in 2000 and 2007-2008, respectively. 
The survey covers a representative sample of about 83 per cent of the Indonesian 
population living in 13 of the 26 provinces in Indonesia; it collects detailed information 
on individual respondents, their families, their households, and the communities that 
they live. We use the individual- and household-level variables: businesses, assets, use 
of healthcare and health insurance, consumption, expenditure, housing characteristics, 
and demographics. To ensure we use only past characteristics as control variables, we 
get the control variables from IFLS-3 whereas the others from IFLS-4.5   
 The sample includes 6,197 firms in non-farm sector that are owned by 4,919 
households; most of them are micro firms in the service sector.6 We follow World 
Bank’s definition on micro- and small firms: micro firms: 1-9 employees; and small 
firms: 10-49 employees (Kushnir, Mirmulstein, & Ramalho, 2010). We exclude firms 
that employ 50 or more workers, those owned by households that hold a health card in 
2004 or earlier, lost Askeskin in 2006-2008, or enrolled in Askeskin in 2008. The 
working sample has 5,901 micro- and small firms. 
 We use two measures of firm performance (the dependent variable): assets and 
net profits, which we get from the non-farm business module (Book 2) of IFLS-4. 
Assets include all non-farm assets: land, building, vehicles, and other non-farm 
equipment. We construct net profits from a question on the amount of net profits 
generated by a business in the previous year. For those respondents who did not know 
their net profits, we use total revenue less total expenses as net profits; all net profits are 
positive.7 We also use other measures of assets: equipment assets, non-equipment 
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assets, assets purchased, and assets sold. All the dependent variables are in Indonesian 
Rupiah and converted to logarithm.  
 We define the key variable of interest, Askeskin status, from a question in the 
health insurance module (Book 3B) of IFLS-4 on whether an individual is the 
policyholder or primary beneficiary of Askeskin. The variable is an indicator equals one 
if a household has at least one Askeskin recipient (or health card recipient) and zero 
otherwise.  
 We use six measures of family hardships: deaths in the family in the previous 
year; deaths in the family in the previous two years, deaths in the family in the previous 
three years, outpatient care, inpatient care, and traffic accidents. We construct the 
dummy variables for deaths in the family from a question on whether a family member 
“moved out” of a household because of death in 2006, 2007 and 2008, using household 
roster (Book K) of IFLS-4. We define outpatient care, inpatient care, and traffic 
accidents from the questions in adult information book (Book 3B) of IFLS-4: outpatient 
care is an indicator equals one if a family member visited a healthcare provider in the 
last four weeks and zero otherwise; inpatient care is an indicator equals one if a family 
member visited an inpatient care in the past 12 months and zero otherwise; and traffic 
accident is an indicator equals one if a family member had had a traffic accident and 
received treatment in the previous three years and zero otherwise.  
 We use other six health insurance (Book 3B of IFLS-4) as control variables in 
all specifications: PT Askes (Insurance Scheme of Civil Servants), Astek Jamsostek 
(Labour Social Insurance), employer provided health insurance, employer provided 
clinic, private insurance, and saving-related insurance. The indicators equal one if a 
household has an insurance and zero otherwise.  
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 The household characteristics (control variables) we use are the quality of 
household dwelling, ownership of household assets, assistance received, and household 
consumption; the indicators are from the consumption module (Book 1) and the 
household characteristics module (Book 2 and Book K) of IFLS-3. The indicators for 
the quality of dwelling include whether a house has ceramic flooring, concrete roofing, 
masonry outer wall, electricity, piped water for drinking, its own toilet facilities, a 
proper garbage disposal system, and a proper sewage drain; the indicators equal one if a 
house has a facility and zero otherwise. The indicators for household assets are the 
ownership of durable goods such as a refrigerator, an electric or gas stove, a television, 
a self-occupied house, other buildings, non-agricultural land, livestock, vehicles, 
household appliances, savings, receivables, and jewellery; the indicators equal one if a 
household owns an asset and zero otherwise. The indicators for assistances that 
households received, which equal one if a household receives an assistance and zero 
otherwise, include whether a household has ever purchased sembako (nine basic foods) 
or goods in a ‘cheap’ market or ‘special market operation’ at a cheaper price than at the 
public market, utilised a village poverty letter, received assistance in the form of food or 
other goods from the government, non-government organisations, and community, and 
whether a house is self-owned. Household consumption includes the total expenditure 
on meat during the past week and on clothing during the past one year; the variables are 
in Indonesian Rupiah and converted to logarithm.8     
 The firm characteristics sets of dummies include whether the business a sole 
ownership, whether the operation of the business is fully outside home and partially 
outside home, urban location, the number of business, type of business, the year a 
business started, household members who own the business, owners outside the 
households who own the business, source of start-up capital, percentage of share 
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owned, and the number of workers when the business started. The data are from the 
non-farm business module (Book 2) of IFLS-4, except for the number of business that 
is from IFLS-3.9 
 The owner characteristics are household heads’ gender, marital status, and 
highest education; households’ religion, ethnical groups, the average age of household 
members, the number of household members, and the number of female household 
members; whether household members can read and write in Indonesian language or 
other language; and whether household members had self-treatment. The variables, 
except the average age of household members, are dummy variables or sets of 
dummies. The data are from the education module (Book 3A) and household roster 
(Book K) of IFLS-3.  
 Households’ knowledge of healthcare facilities includes whether a household 
head knows the location of the nearest public and private hospitals, Puskesmas, private 
clinic, private physician, midwife, nurse, traditional birth attendant, traditional 
practitioner, pharmacy, Posyandu, and village post.10 The control variables are dummy 
variables that equal one if a household knows the location of a health facility and zero 
otherwise; the data are from the knowledge of health and family planning service 
module (Book 1) of IFLS-3.  
[Table 1 near here] 
Table 1, which presents the summary statistics by Askeskin status, shows that 
Askeskin household firms and those owned by non-Askeskin household differ in their 
performance but not owners’ experience of family hardships. Panel A shows that 
Askeskin household firms have statistically lower assets and net profits of about Rp 10 
million and Rp 4 million (about US$1,000 and US$425 in 2008), respectively, 
compared to non-Askeskin household firms; their equipment assets and non-equipment 
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assets are also about Rp 5 million and Rp 5.5 million (about US$530 and US$580 in 
2008) lower. Panel B shows that the proportion of household that experienced family 
hardships such as deaths in the family, inpatient care, and traffic accidents is similar 
between Askeskin households and non-Askeskin households, but Askeskin households 
are more likely to have outpatient care. Table A1 in Appendix A shows that Askeskin 
households’ characteristics differ from those of non-Askeskin households, but the 
households and their firms do not differ much in ownership of other health insurance, 
owner characteristic, firm characteristics, and knowledge of healthcare facilities 
(though many differences are statistically significant).  
The sample suggests that, except for firm performance and owners’ household 
characteristics, the two groups of firms are economically similar in many respects, 
though many mean differences are statistically significant. The variation in firm 
performance, therefore, may be the result of the differences in these variables, instead 
of Askeskin status alone. When we control for the observed characteristics and the 
district fixed effects in the regression (as we discuss in Section 3.1), the estimates of the 
control variables pick up the variation in firm performance that Askeskin does not 
explain, which make the two groups of firms more comparable. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 The effects of Askeskin and family hardships on firm performance 
Table 2 reports the basic results for the regressions of firms’ assets or net profits on 
Askeskin and family hardships, which we define as having deaths in the family in the 
previous year. Columns in each panel are the estimates of the effects of Askeskin and 
family hardships, with and without control variables. We control for district fixed 
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effects and other insurance held by the households in column 1; in the other columns, 
we add household characteristics (column 2), firm characteristics (column 3), owner 
characteristics and knowledge of health facilities (column 4) as control variables.   
[Table 2 near here] 
The estimates in Panel A of Table 2 show little evidence that Askeskin may 
cushion the adverse effects of deaths in the family in the previous year on firms’ assets. 
Column 1 shows, in a regression that controls only district fixed effects and other 
insurance held by the households, Askeskin household firms cope better with the deaths 
in the family (the estimate of the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant). We get similar estimates when we also control for household-, firm-, and 
owner characteristics, as well as knowledge of healthcare facilities (in columns 2, 3 and 
4, respectively), though those in the third and the fourth columns are statistically 
insignificant. The estimate in column 4 does not show evidence that Askeskin protects 
firms’ assets against deaths in the family (the estimate of the interaction term is positive 
and large but statistically insignificant). Deaths in the family are correlated with 91 per 
cent (the sum of the estimates of deaths in the family and the interaction term) higher 
assets for Askeskin household firms, but the estimate is statistically significant.   
Panel B, in which we use net profits as the dependent variable, shows some 
evidence that Askeskin helps firms recover from deaths in the family in the previous 
year. Columns 1 shows that, in a regression with district fixed effects and other 
insurance held by the households as control variables, Askeskin household firms cope 
better with deaths in the family (the estimate of the interaction term is large, positive 
and statistically significant). It remains statistically significant even after we control for 
household-, firm- and owner characteristics, as well as knowledge of healthcare 
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facilities (columns 2-4); in the most complete specification, the estimate of the 
interaction term is large, 1.45; it is statistically significant at ten per cent level.  
In sum, we find some evidence that owners of micro and small firms may be 
better able to cope with deaths in the family in the previous year if their households are 
insured. In the regressions that control for all available observed characteristics, we find 
Askeskin reduces possible adverse effects of deaths in the family in the previous year on 
net profits but not assets. These results support literature that finds social health 
insurance effective in providing financial risk protection (Levine, Polimeni, & Ramage, 
2015; Wagstaff & Yu, 2007; Wagstaff, 2010).  
 We should cautiously interpret these estimates because the evidence is 
statistically weak; moreover, the regressions may not fully overcome the selection bias 
because some characteristics are unobservable. The estimates of Askeskin in both panels 
are negative and statistically significant, which suggests, among households that did not 
experience family hardships, Askeskin households have smaller firms. The magnitudes 
of the estimates are large, more than 0.4 in the assets’ regressions and more than 0.2 in 
the net profits ones. The estimates of family hardships in Panel A are large and negative 
but they are statistically insignificant, which means, among non-Askeskin households, 
family hardships correlate with smaller firms; the estimates in Panel B are smaller but 
also statistically insignificant.  
 
4.2. Use of alternative measures of family hardships 
We examine whether the results are robust to the use of alternative measures of family 
hardships: deaths in the family in the past couple of years and sickness in the family. 
We use deaths in the family that happened in the previous two or three years to 
incorporate family hardships happened in earlier periods.11 We define three dummy 
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variables for sickness in the family: (i) whether a household had at least one family 
members who had outpatient care in the previous month, (ii) whether a household had 
at least one family members who had inpatient care (hospitalisation) in the previous 
year, and (iii) whether a household had at least one family members who experienced a 
traffic accident and received treatment in the previous three years.  
[Table 3 near here] 
Table 3, which presents the regressions of firms’ assets on Askeskin, other 
measures of family hardships and the interaction terms, shows little evidence that 
Askeskin household firms cope better with family hardships. In Panel A, we find no 
evidence that Askeskin reduces the adverse effects of deaths in the family in the 
previous two years on firms’ assets. In column 4, the sum of the three estimates show 
that, compared to non-Askeskin household firms that did not experience deaths in the 
family in the previous two years (the benchmark category), the family hardship 
correlates with 48 per cent higher assets for Askeskin household firms, but the estimate 
of the interaction term is statistically insignificant. In Panel B, in which we use deaths 
in the family in the previous three years as the measure of family hardships, we get 
similar results; the estimates of the interaction term are in fact negative but none of 
them is statistically significant.  
In Panel C, however, we find evidence that Askeskin helps the firms recover 
from the owners’ outpatient care need. The effect is large and positive; the estimate of 
the interaction term is statistically significant even after we control for all available 
observed characteristics; the sum of the estimates of outpatient care and the interaction 
term suggests that assets of firms whose owners had the need of outpatient care are 37 
per cent higher if the owners or their households are Askeskin recipients. The estimates 
of Askeskin show that, among firms whose owners did not experience family hardships, 
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Askeskin household firms have smaller assets (the estimates are negative and 
statistically significant). In the regression that includes all control variables, the 
negative and statistically significant estimate of outpatient care suggests that, among 
firms owned by non-Askeskin households, the hardship reduces assets of the firms by 55 
per cent. 
Panel D, in which we define family hardships using inpatient care, shows no 
evidence that Askeskin protects firms against the owners’ need of inpatient care. None 
of the estimates of the interaction term is statistically significant although the estimates 
are large and positive. Likewise, the estimates of inpatient care are statistically 
insignificant, as indicated by their large standard errors. The estimates of Askeskin 
show, among firms owned by households that did not experience family hardships, 
Askeskin household firms have smaller assets. In column 4, the sum of the three 
estimates suggests that inpatient care need of the owners and Askeskin jointly correlate 
with 17 per cent higher assets, but we fail to reject the null hypothesis of the effect of 
inpatient care does not differ by Askeskin status.  
In Panel E, the results show no evidence that Askeskin helps firms cope with the 
effects from traffic accidents experienced by owners (the estimates of the interaction 
term are negative but statistically insignificant). The estimates of Askeskin are negative 
and statistically significant like those in Panels C and D; the estimates of traffic 
accidents are statistically insignificant.   
[Table 4 near here] 
Table 4, which uses net profits as the dependent variable, shows evidence that 
Askeskin reduces possible adverse effects of outpatient care and traffic accidents, but 
not those of other measures of family hardships. In Panels A-B, we use deaths in the 
family in the previous two and three years, respectively, to define family hardships, and 
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we do not find the effect of deaths in the family in the previous two or three years 
changes by Askeskin status; the estimates of the interaction terms are positive but 
statistically insignificant after we control for all available characteristics: experiencing 
deaths in the previous two years and three years, respectively, correlate with 52 per cent 
and 38 per cent higher net profits if owners are Askeskin households. We do not find 
Askeskin and deaths in the family matter either in Panel A; however, the estimate of 
Askeskin is statistically significant at ten per cent level in Panel B in the estimation that 
includes all available control variables. 
Panel C, which uses outpatient care to define family hardships, shows a decrease 
in the adverse effects of outpatient care, by about 44 per cent among Askeskin 
household firms. The estimates of the interaction term are positive and statistically 
significant in the regressions even after we control for all available characteristics. The 
estimates of Askeskin suggest that, among households that did not experience family 
hardships, Askeskin household firms have smaller net profits. In the regression that we 
control for all available characteristics, the estimate of outpatient care shows, among 
firms owned by non-Askeskin households, outpatient care reduces net profits by 18 per 
cent (the estimate is positive and statistically significant).   
In Panel D, in which we use inpatient care to define family hardships, shows no 
evidence that Askeskin helps firms withstand the family hardship (the estimate of the 
interaction term is negative in the last column but statistically insignificant). The 
estimates of Askeskin are negative and statistically significant, implying that, among 
firms owned by households that did not experience the hardship, Askeskin household 
firms have smaller net profits. We do not find inpatient care matters for the firms’ net 
profits (its estimates are positive but statistically insignificant).  
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 Panel E, which reports the effects of Askeskin and traffic accidents, shows some 
evidence that Askeskin reduces possible adverse effects of traffic accidents experienced 
by owners on net profits in all the regressions. The estimates of the interaction term are 
large, positive and statistically significant at ten per cent level in the most preferred 
estimation (column 4): net profits of Askeskin household firms are 13 per cent higher. 
We find, among households that did not experience traffic accidents, Askeskin 
household firms have smaller net profits; the estimate of Askeskin is negative and 
statistically significant. The estimates of traffic accidents are statistically insignificant, 
indicating no evidence that the hardship affects net profits.    
 
4.3 Subsamples 
Table 5 presents the regression by subsample: micro firms that hire fewer than ten 
workers and those whose assets are below Rp 50 million. The numbers in each column 
are the estimates of the interaction between Askeskin and family hardships (see Tables 
A3 and A4 in Appendix A for full results).     
[Table 5 near here] 
 Panel A, which presents the results of micro firms with fewer than ten workers, 
shows evidence that Askeskin household firms cope better with deaths in the family in 
the previous year and owners’ need of outpatient care. We find evidence that Askeskin 
reduces the adverse effects of deaths in the family in the previous on net profits but not 
firms’ assets. We also find Askeskin protects firms’ assets and net profits against the 
adverse effect of owners’ need of outpatient care; the estimates of the interaction terms 
are positive and statistically significant.  
 In Panel B, in which we use the sample of micro firms with assets below Rp 50 
million, we find some evidence that Askeskin helps owners recover from deaths in the 
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family in the previous year and owners’ need of outpatient care, but the results differ by 
the measures of firm performance. We find evidence that Askeskin protects firms’ profits 
and assets, respectively, against deaths in the family in the previous year and owners’ 
outpatient care need.  
 To summarise, the results by subsample are similar to the basic results. We find 
some evidence that Askeskin protects firms’ net profits against death in the family in the 
previous year and outpatient care, particularly for micro firms with fewer than ten 
workers. As for firms’ total assets, we find evidence that Askeskin reduces the adverse 
effects of outpatient care but not deaths in the family in the previous year.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Askeskin seems to partially help micro- and small firms in Indonesia recover from the 
owners’ experience of family hardships: it absorbs some adverse effects of recent deaths 
in the family (in the previous year) and traffic accidents on net profits but not on assets. 
It also reduces some adverse effects of owners’ outpatient care need on assets and net 
profits: with Askeskin, assets and net profits, respectively, are 92 and 44 per cent higher 
among the firms whose owners suffering the family hardship. It may help owners 
withstand other types of hardships (the magnitude of most estimates of the interaction 
terms are large), but the estimates are statistically insignificant. Analyses by firm size are 
similar: Askeskin may help micro- and small firms recover from recent deaths in the 
family, particularly net profits—the estimates of the interaction term are large but some 
are statistically insignificant.  
The evidence that Askeskin partially reduces the adverse effects of family 
hardship on firm performance is in line with the empirical literature of internal finance. 
Internal finance growth theory suggests that, with limited access to external finance, 
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small firms’ growth is sensitive to the availability of internal finance; and several 
papers highlight that public policies can help small firms grow by obtaining external 
finance or increasing productivity (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2005, 2008; 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, & Maksimovic, 2006; Guariglia, Liu, & Song, 2011). 
Our results may imply that social health insurance protects micro- and small firms’ 
internal funds through reducing healthcare spending and the needs of costly coping 
strategy (Wagstaff & Prahan, 2006; Wagstaff & Yu, 2007), as well as improving 
owners’ and family workers’ human capital and productivity (Wagstaff & Prahan, 
2006; Wang et al., 2009).  
 The findings that family hardships (that is, outpatient care) reduce assets and net 
profits among firms owned by uninsured households are in line with the literature of 
family hardships. Sickness or health shocks can reduce the income of micro- and small 
firms through the trade-off between catastrophic health expenditures (Axel, 2016) and 
reduction in households’ productivity (Isoto, Sam, and Kraybill, 2016) and household 
heads’ labour hour worked (Nguyet and Mangyo, 2010). In contrast to Parinduri 
(2014)’s the findings on micro- and small firms in Indonesia, we find sickness in the 
family (that is, outpatient care) reduces assets and net profits, but we do not find deaths 
in the family matter for firms’ growth. One reason is that perhaps the households are 
able to adjust their labour supply following the loss of a household member (Liu, 2013) 
or health shocks are more likely to induce sale of assets to pay treatment costs (Yilma et 
al., 2015). Another possible reason is because we use different measures of family 
hardships.  
 Askeskin seems to reduce assets and net profits among micro- and small firms 
whose households did not experience family hardships. It is possible that recipients of 
social health insurance are more likely to seek care even though they do not need to. A 
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more generous insurance scheme may encourage people to use healthcare services and 
more expensive care, which can increase the risk of high out-of-pocket expenditures; 
moreover, healthcare providers may try to increase out-of-pocket payments through 
inducing demand for uncovered services (Sparrow, Suryahadi, & Widyanti 2010; 
Wagstaff et al., 2009; Wagstaff & Lindelow, 2008). It may also because we have not 
completely controlled for differences between Askeskin- and non-Askeskin recipients.  
 The findings imply that social health insurance, through speeding recovery 
process, may improve micro- and small firms’ financial viability, in which many 
programmes such as microcredit and microinsurance have been focusing on. Given its 
wide coverage and outreach, social health insurance may stimulate the growth of micro- 
and small firms, hence, job creation and economic growth. Expansion of social health 
insurance programmes, therefore, may yield not only a healthier population but also 
create some spillover benefits. 
 We can see the findings in this paper as potential benefits of social health 
insurance: It empowers owners of micro- and small firms. However, for policy 
implications of our results, we need to consider several limitations. One, our analysis 
relies on cross-sectional data, which remains vulnerable to heterogeneity of unobserved 
factors that may affect total assets and net profits, whether a person enrols in Askeskin, 
and whether she experienced a family hardship. We do control for all available 
variables in the data and examine robustness of the estimates, but limitations remain: 
we may not fully overcome the selection bias because some characteristics are 
unobservable or unavailable. Two, we only measure the short-term effect of Askeskin 
from 2006 to 2008. Initial implementation of Askeskin experienced various 
shortcomings, which may affect the selection of right target group for the insurance. 
Besides, because the Indonesian government is reforming the Askeskin programme and 
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rolling it out to other target groups, its impact may differ from those we found in this 
paper, so future work can examine its effects as it evolves. Three, we do not control for 
supply-side factors such as quality of public healthcare, which may affect the decision 
of recipients to use Askeskin, and we cannot measure the extent to which the supply-
side factors contribute to the variation in firm performance.  
 
1 Askes stands for Asuransi Kesehatan (Health Insurance for Civil Servants); Asabri stands for 
Asuransi Social Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Health Insurance for the Armed 
Forces and Police), Taspen stands for Dana Tabungan and Asuransi Pegawai Negeri (The 
Fund for Civil Servants); and Jamsostek stands for Jaminan Social Tenaga Kerja (Social 
Insurance for Private Sector Workers). The Askes scheme covers civil servants and their 
families, as well as retirees of the civil service, including those from the military. All the 
beneficiaries contribute two per cent of their base salary regardless of the number of 
dependants. Jamsostek is the health insurance for formal private sector workers. The scheme 
requires employers to contribute three to six per cent of private sector workers salaries, 
depending on the marital status of the beneficiary (ILO, 2008). 
2 The premium rate increased to Rp 6,500 per person per month under Jamkesmas in 2007. 
After the programme evolved into JKN, only the poor and the near poor received free 
coverage, other insurance programmes (that is, for civil servants, the military, the police, 
pensioners, and staff of state enterprises) involved financial contributions by both the 
employer and the employee (Mboi, 2015).  
3 The indicators are: (1) floor type; (2) wall and roof type; (3) toilet facility; (4) electrical 
source; (5) cooking fuel source; (6) drinking water source; (7) frequency of meat 
consumption; (8) frequency of meal consumption; (9) frequency of purchase of new clothes; 
(10) access to public health facilities; (11) primary source of income; (12) educational 
attainment of household head; (13) amount of savings and type of assets; and (14) floor 
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width. Unfortunately, the data used to devise the official proxy-means test are not available 
to researchers (Sumarto & Bazzi 2011). 
4 The government has tried to improve the Askeskin programme. It refined the targeting system, 
through the National Targeting System and Unified Database for Social Protection 
Programmes, to minimise targeting errors and reduce leakages and under-coverage. It also 
improved healthcare delivery and financing through upgrading healthcare facilities, 
expanding the number of beds at hospitals, improving service quality of healthcare 
providers, and improving provision of healthcare services in rural and remote areas. 
Moreover, in 2011, the government enacted the BPJS (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan 
Social, Social Security Administrator Body) law to pool and harmonise fund 
reimbursements and administration of all insurance schemes in Indonesia (Harimurti et al., 
2013). 
5 The data are available at http://www.rand.org/labor/FLS/IFLS/html. See Strauss et al. (2004), 
Strauss et al. (2009a), and Thomas et al. (2012) for more details.  
6 In this paper, we exclude farm businesses because firm characteristics, which we use as 
control variables, are different between non-farm and farm businesses. 
7 In the IFLS, respondents were first asked the amount of net profits, and only those who did not 
have an answer were prompted the amount of total revenue and total expenses. Very few 
respondents answer the questions on total revenue and total expenses. 
8 Sembako (Sembilan Bahan Pokok) refers to nine necessities that include rice, granulated sugar, 
cooking oil and butter, meat, chicken eggs, milk, corn, kerosene, and salt (based on the 
decision by Ministry of Industry and Trade, Indonesia, no. 115/mpp/kep/2/1998). The 
village poverty letter (Surat Keterangan Tidak Mampu) is a certificate indicating a citizen is 
economically less capable, not capable, or poor. 
9 We note that good controls are those variables that have been fixed at the time Askeskin was 
determined, but we do not use the firm characteristics from IFLS-3 because of large sample 
attrition by over 2,000 observations, owing to unmatched firm identity between IFLS-3 and 
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IFLS-4. Since the firm characteristics we use are unlikely to vary by Askeskin status, they 
are thus reliable control variables. 
10 Puskesmas stands for Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat, Community Health Clinics. Posyandu is 
sub-community health clinic. 
11 For the specifications of deaths in the family in the previous two years and the previous three 
years, we drop the households that received Askeskin for the first time in 2007 and 2008, and 
those who lost Askeskin in 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 Mean 
 With Askeskin Without 
Askeskin 
Difference  
(2)-(1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
A. Dependent Variables    
Assets 8.20 18.92 10.72*** 
 (70.07) (76.12) (3.09) 
Net Profits 6.45 10.59 4.14*** 
 (23.22) (29.11) (1.17) 
Equipment assets 2.61 7.83 5.22*** 
 (12.86) (34.11) (1.33) 
Non-equipment assets 5.59 11.10 5.51** 
 (63.70) (62.67) (2.57) 
B. Family Hardships    
Deaths in the family 0.001 0.004 0.003 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.003) 
Outpatient care 0.41 0.34 -0.06*** 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.02) 
Inpatient care 0.09 0.08 -0.01 
 (0.29) (0.28) (0.01) 
Traffic accidents 0.13 0.12 -0.00 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.01) 
    
Number of observations 672 5229 5901 
    
Notes: The numbers are means. The numbers in parentheses in columns 1 and 2 are standard deviations; 
the numbers in parentheses in column 3 are standard errors. The dependent variables in Panel A are in 
millions of Indonesian Rupiah. The asterisks *** and ** indicate statistical significance at 1% and 5%, 
respectively.
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Table 2. The effects of Askeskin and family hardships on assets and net profits 
Dependent variable (in logarithm) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Assets      
Askeskin (1) -1.05*** -0.62*** -0.46** -0.47** 
  (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) 
Deaths in the family (2) -0.94 -0.86 -0.98 -1.19 
  (1.28) (1.37) (1.37) (1.41) 
Deaths × Askeskin (3) 4.68*** 3.55*** 0.38 2.10 
  (1.29) (1.53) (1.63) (1.78) 
      
Number of observations  5,851 5,783 5,649 5,519 
Adjusted-R2  0.05 0.07 0.18 0.19 
      
B. Net profits      
Askeskin (4) -0.40*** -0.23** -0.22** -0.28** 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) 
Deaths in the family (5) -0.27 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 
  (0.47) (0.47) (0.37) (0.41) 
Deaths × Askeskin (6) 2.07*** 1.56*** 1.11* 1.45* 
  (0.49) (0.59) (0.67) (0.78) 
      
Number of observations  5,851 5,783 5,649 5,519 
Adjusted-R2  0.07 0.07 0.16 0.16 
      
Control variables:      
Household characteristics  . ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Firm characteristics  . . ✓ ✓ 
Owner characteristics; 
knowledge of healthcare 
facilities 
 . . . ✓ 
     
      
Notes: The numbers in each column are the estimates of regressions of assets or net profits on Askeskin, 
deaths in the family in the previous year, and the interaction between Askeskin and deaths in the family, 
without (column 1) and with control variables (columns 2-4). All regressions include district dummies 
and the dummies for other insurance held by the households. The sample excludes two groups of 
individuals: (i) those who lost Askeskin in 2006, 2007, or 2008; and (ii) those who enrolled in Askeskin in 
2008. Deaths in the family equals one if at least one family member died in the previous year and zero if 
otherwise. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered by districts. The asterisks 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 3. Other measures of family hardships and assets as the dependent variable 
Dependent variable: Assets  
(in logarithm) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Deaths in the family in the previous two years   
Askeskin (1) -0.86*** -0.43* -0.41* -0.41 
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) 
Deaths in the family (2) 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.19 
  (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.47) 
Deaths × Askeskin (3) 0.75 1.06 0.63 0.70 
  (1.32) (1.22) (1.07) (1.10) 
      
Number of observations  5,723 5,659 5,530 5,406 
      
B. Deaths in the family in the previous three years   
Askeskin (4) -0.80*** -0.38 -0.32 -0.30 
  (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) 
Deaths in the family (5) 0.29 0.34 0.22 0.35 
  (0.33) (0.32) (0.31) (0.32) 
Deaths × Askeskin (6) -0.01 0.12 -0.39 -0.56 
  (0.11) (1.05) (1.01) (1.08) 
      
Number of observations  5,644 5,580 5,452 5,329 
      
C. Outpatient care      
Askeskin (7) -1.38*** -0.90*** -0.77*** -0.80*** 
  (0.29) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) 
Outpatient care (8) -0.18 -0.25 -0.46*** -0.55*** 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Outpatient care × Askeskin (9) 0.84** 0.73* 0.82** 0.92** 
  (0.40) (0.41) (0.39) (0.41) 
      
Number of observations  5,849 5,781 5,647 5,517 
      
D. Inpatient care      
Askeskin (10) -1.14*** -0.69*** -0.54*** -0.55** 
  (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) 
Inpatient care (11) -0.06 -0.13 -0.18 -0.30 
  (0.34) (0.33) (0.31) (0.32) 
Inpatient care × Askeskin (12) 0.96 0.84 0.92 1.02 
  (0.71) (0.70) (0.64) (0.67) 
      
Number of observations  5,851 5,783 5,649 5,519 
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Table 3. Other measures of family hardships and assets as the dependent variable 
(continued) 
Dependent variable: Assets  
(in logarithm) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
E. Traffic accidents      
Askeskin (13) -1.01*** -0.57** -0.40* -0.40* 
  (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) 
Traffic accident (14) 0.25 0.15 0.05 0.12 
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) 
Traffic acc × Askeskin (15) -0.30 -0.35 -0.42 -0.47 
  (0.65) (0.65) (0.56) (0.60) 
      
Number of observations  5,851 5,783 5,649 5,519 
      
Control variables:      
Household characteristics  . ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Firm characteristics  . . ✓ ✓ 
Owner characteristics; 
knowledge of healthcare 
facilities 
 . . . ✓ 
     
      
Notes: The numbers in each column are the estimates of regressions of assets on Askeskin, a measure of 
family hardships, and the interaction between Askeskin and family hardships, without (column 1) and 
with control variables (columns 2-4). All regressions include district dummies and the dummies for other 
insurance held the by households. The sample excludes two groups of individuals: (i) those who lost 
Askeskin in 2006, 2007, or 2008; and (ii) those who enrolled in Askeskin in 2008. In Panel A, deaths in 
the family equal one if at least one family member died in the previous two years and zero otherwise. The 
sample also excludes those who enrolled in Askeskin in 2007. In Panel B, deaths in the family equal one if 
at least one family member died in the previous three years and zero otherwise. The sample also excludes 
those who enrolled in Askeskin in 2006-2007. In Panel C, outpatient care equals one if a household had at 
least one family member had outpatient care in the previous month and zero otherwise. In Panel D, 
inpatient care equals one if a household had at least one family member hospitalised in the previous year 
and zero otherwise. In Panel E, traffic accidents equal one if a household had at least one family member 
had a traffic accident and received treatment in the previous three years and zero otherwise. The adjusted-
R2 in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 are 0.05, 0.07, 0.18, and 0.19, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are 
robust standard errors, clustered by districts. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Other measures of family hardships and net profits as the dependent variable 
Dependent variable: Net profits  
(in logarithm) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Deaths in the family in the previous two years   
Askeskin (1) -0.30** -0.12 -0.15 -0.18 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
Deaths in the family (2) -0.01 0.01 -0.12 -0.08 
  (0.27) (0.27) (0.25) (0.26) 
Deaths × Askeskin (3) 0.39 0.53 0.71* 0.60 
  (0.47) (0.44) (0.38) (0.44) 
      
Number of observations  5,723 5,659 5,530 5,406 
      
B. Deaths in the family in the previous three years   
Askeskin (4) -0.36*** -0.19 -0.19 -0.23* 
  (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) 
Deaths in the family (5) -0.14 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 
  (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) 
Deaths × Askeskin (6) 0.56 0.60* 0.49 0.47 
  (0.35) (0.32) (0.30) (0.36) 
      
Number of observations  5,644 5,580 5,452 5,329 
      
C. Outpatient care      
Askeskin (7) -0.57*** -0.39** -0.41*** -0.45*** 
  (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) 
Outpatient care (8) -0.13 -0.15* -0.18** -0.18** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Outpatient care × Askeskin (9) 0.44** 0.41* 0.48** 0.44** 
  (0.22) (0.23) (0.20) (0.20) 
      
Number of observations  5,849 5,781 5,647 5,517 
      
D. Inpatient care      
Askeskin (10) -0.41*** -0.24* -0.22** -0.27** 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
Inpatient care (11) 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) 
Inpatient care × Askeskin (12) 0.06 0.08 0.00 -0.09 
  (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.40) 
      
Number of observations  5,851 5,783 5,649 5,519 
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Table 4. Other measures of family hardships and net profits as the dependent variable 
(continued) 
Dependent variable: Net profits  
(in logarithm) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
E. Traffic accidents      
Askeskin (13) -0.45*** -0.28** -0.27** -0.34*** 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
Traffic accident (14) 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.03 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
Traffic acc × Askeskin (15) 0.37 0.38 0.41* 0.44* 
  (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) 
      
Number of observations  5,851 5,783 5,649 5,519 
Control variables:      
Household characteristics  . ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Firm characteristics  . . ✓ ✓ 
Owner characteristics; 
knowledge of healthcare 
facilities 
 . . . ✓ 
     
      
Notes: The numbers in each column are the estimates of regressions of net profits on Askeskin, a measure 
of family hardships, and the interaction between Askeskin and family hardships, without (column 1) and 
with control variables (columns 2-4). All regressions include district dummies and the dummies for other 
insurance held by the households. The sample excludes two groups of individuals: (i) those who lost 
Askeskin in 2006, 2007, or 2008; and (ii) those who enrolled in Askeskin in 2008. In Panel A, deaths in 
the family equal one if at least one family member died in the previous two years and zero otherwise. The 
sample also excludes those who enrolled in Askeskin in 2007. In Panel B, deaths in the family equal one if 
at least one family member died in the previous three years and zero otherwise. The sample also excludes 
those who enrolled in Askeskin in 2006-2007. In Panel C, outpatient care equals one if a household had at 
least one family member had outpatient care in the previous month and zero otherwise. In Panel D, 
inpatient care equals one if a household had at least one family member hospitalised in the previous year 
and zero otherwise. In Panel E, traffic accidents equal one if a household had at least one family member 
had a traffic accident and received treatment in the previous three years and zero otherwise. The adjusted-
R2 in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 are 0.06, 0.07, 0.16, and 0.16, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are 
robust standard errors, clustered by districts. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5. Subsamples 
Dependent variable (in logarithm) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Micro firms with fewer than ten workers 
Assets 
  
Deaths × Askeskin (1) 4.65*** 3.59** 0.30 2.01 
  (1.29) (1.53) (1.63) (1.72) 
Outpatient care × Askeskin (2) 0.83** 0.73* 0.81** 0.85** 
  (0.39) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41) 
Net Profits      
Deaths × Askeskin (3) 2.02*** 1.51*** 0.96 1.32* 
  (0.47) (0.58) (0.66) (0.74) 
Outpatient care × Askeskin (4) 0.40* 0.37* 0.46** 0.43** 
  (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) 
      
Number of observations  5,781 5,713 5,579 5,450 
B. Micro firms with assets below Rp 50 million 
Assets 
  
Deaths × Askeskin (5) 5.21*** 3.78** 0.59 2.45 
  (1.33) (1.52) (1.70) (1.85) 
Outpatient care × Askeskin (6) 0.79** 0.70* 0.79** 0.77* 
  (0.39) (0.41) (0.39) (0.41) 
Net profits      
Deaths × Askeskin (7) 2.29*** 1.49*** 0.98* 1.29** 
  (0.45) (0.57) (0.55) (0.63) 
Outpatient care × Askeskin (8) 0.27 0.24 0.32 0.27 
  (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) 
      
Number of observations  5,420 5,360 5,236 5,113 
      
Control variables:      
Household characteristics  . ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Firm characteristics  . . ✓ ✓ 
Owner characteristics; 
knowledge of healthcare 
facilities 
 . . . ✓ 
      
Notes: The numbers in each column are the estimates of the interaction between Askeskin and family 
hardships, without (column 1) and with control variables (columns 2-4). All regressions include district 
dummies and the dummies for other insurance held by the households. The sample excludes two groups 
of individuals: (i) those who lost Askeskin in 2006, 2007, or 2008; and (ii) those who enrolled in Askeskin 
in 2008. Deaths in the family equals one if at least one family member died in the previous year and zero 
otherwise. Outpatient care equals one if a household had at least one family member had outpatient care 
in the previous month and zero otherwise. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, 
clustered by districts. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.  
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Summary statistics 
 Mean 
 With Askeskin Without 
Askeskin 
Difference  
(2)-(1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
A. Household Characteristics    
Purchases goods at a cheaper price 0.58 0.34 -0.24*** 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.02) 
Receives community assistance 0.06 0.03 -0.03*** 
 (0.23) (0.16) (0.01) 
Receives assistance from government 0.07 0.03 -0.04*** 
 (0.26) (0.18) (0.01) 
House self-owned 0.81 0.82 0.01 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.02) 
Has electricity 0.91 0.95 0.04*** 
 (0.29) (0.22) (0.01) 
Has piped water for drinking 0.24 0.30 0.07*** 
 (0.42) (0.46) (0.02) 
Has own toilet facilities 0.52 0.72 0.20*** 
 (0.50) (0.45) (0.02) 
Disposes garbage in trash can 0.21 0.29 0.09*** 
 (0.40) (0.46) (0.02) 
Uses letter for the poor 0.11 0.05 -0.06*** 
 (0.31) (0.21) (0.01) 
Drains sewage in drainage ditch 0.44 0.55 0.10*** 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.02) 
Owns a refrigerator 0.05 0.19 0.14*** 
 (0.21) (0.39) (0.02) 
Owns an electric/gas stove 0.03 0.16 0.13*** 
 (0.18) (0.37) (0.01) 
Owns a television 0.53 0.72 0.19*** 
 (0.50) (0.45) (0.02) 
Floor made of ceramic 0.08 0.20 0.12*** 
 (0.28) (0.40) (0.02) 
Wall made of masonry 0.55 0.72 0.17*** 
 (0.50) (0.45) (0.02) 
Concrete roofing 0.68 0.66 -0.01 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.02) 
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Table A1. Summary statistics (continued) 
 Mean 
 With  
Askeskin 
Without 
Askeskin 
Difference 
(2)-(1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
A. Household Characteristics    
Owns the land and self-occupied 
house 0.81 0.83 0.01 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.02) 
Owns other house/building 0.07 0.14 0.06*** 
 (0.26) (0.34) (0.01) 
Owns non-agricultural land 0.13 0.20 0.07*** 
 (0.34) (0.40) (0.02) 
Owns livestock 0.03 0.03 0.00 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.01) 
Owns vehicles 
 
0.41 0.53 0.12*** 
(0.49) (0.50) (0.02) 
Owns household appliances 0.74 0.88 0.14*** 
 (0.44) (0.33) (0.01) 
Has savings 0.23 0.35 0.12*** 
 (0.42) (0.48) (0.02) 
Owns receivables 0.10 0.16 0.06*** 
 (0.30) (0.36) (0.01) 
Owns jewellery 0.59 0.68 0.09*** 
 (0.49) (0.47) (0.02) 
Expenditure on clothes  0.28 0.44 0.16*** 
 (0.42) (0.74) (0.03) 
Expenditure on meat 0.01 0.02 0.01*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.001) 
B. Owns Other Insurance    
Health insurance for civil servants 
(PT ASKES) 
0.05 0.11 0.05*** 
(0.23) (0.31) (0.01) 
Labour social insurance (ASTEK 
Jamsostek) 
0.05 0.08 0.03** 
(0.22) (0.27) (0.01) 
Employer provided health insurance 0.02 0.03 0.01* 
 (0.13) (0.17) (0.01) 
Employer provided clinic 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.01) 
Private insurance 0.01 0.02 0.02*** 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.01) 
Saving-related insurance 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) 
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Table A1. Summary statistics (continued) 
 Mean   
 With  
Askeskin 
Without 
Askeskin 
Difference 
(2)-(1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
C. Firm Characteristics    
Number of business 0.84 0.94 0.10*** 
 (0.77) (0.84) (0.03) 
Year business started 1997.60 1998.58 0.97** 
 (10.63) (9.78) (0.41) 
Number of workers  0.93 1.29 0.35*** 
 (1.66) (2.39) (0.09) 
Percentage of share 98.85 98.27 -0.58 
 (9.14) (10.50) (0.42) 
Sole ownership 0.98 0.97 -0.01* 
 (0.13) (0.17) (0.01) 
Operation of business is all outside 
home 
0.56 0.51 -0.04** 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.02) 
Operation of business is partially 
outside home 
0.25 0.24 -0.01 
(0.43) (0.42) (0.02) 
Urban location 0.47 0.53 0.07*** 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.02) 
Start-up capital (savings) 0.42 0.52 0.10*** 
 (0.49) (0.50) (0.02) 
Start-up capital (family members) 0.39 0.35 -0.04** 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.02) 
Start-up capital (other owners) 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.01) 
Start-up capital (banks) 0.02 0.03 0.01** 
 (0.13) (0.17) (0.01) 
D. Owner Characteristics    
Household size 6.30 6.13 -0.17 
 (2.78) (2.80) (0.12) 
Average age of household member 29.67 29.50 -0.17 
 (11.57) (9.87) (0.41) 
Male household head 0.84 0.86 0.02 
 (0.36) (0.35) (0.01) 
Household head is married 0.82 0.84 0.01 
 (0.38) (0.37) (0.02) 
Number of female household 
members 1.61 1.56 -0.05 
 (1.88) (1.89) (0.08) 
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Table A1. Summary statistics (continued) 
 Mean 
 With  
Askeskin 
Without 
Askeskin 
Difference 
(2)-(1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
D. Owner Characteristics    
Religion: Islam 0.94 0.89 -0.06*** 
 (0.23) (0.32) (0.01) 
High school education 0.12 0.19 0.08*** 
 (0.32) (0.39) (0.02) 
Can read 0.93 0.97 0.04*** 
 (0.26) (0.17) (0.01) 
Can write 0.92 0.97 0.05*** 
 (0.27) (0.18) (0.01) 
E. Knowledge of healthcare facilities  
Knows the location of a public 
hospital 0.75 0.79 0.04** 
 (0.43) (0.41) (0.02) 
Knows the location of a private 
hospital 
0.49 0.55 0.07*** 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.02) 
Knows the location of Puskesmas 0.94 0.94 -0.00 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.01) 
Knows the location of a private clinic 0.53 0.58 0.05** 
 (0.50) (0.49) (0.02) 
Knows the location of a private 
physician 
0.79 0.78 -0.00 
(0.41) (0.41) (0.02) 
Knows the location of a midwife 0.37 0.34 -0.03* 
 (0.48) (0.47) (0.02) 
Knows the location of a nurse 0.69 0.58 -0.11*** 
 (0.46) (0.49) (0.02) 
Knows the location of a traditional 
birth attendant 
0.28 0.26 -0.02 
(0.45) (0.44) (0.02) 
Knows the location of a traditional 
practitioner 
0.61 0.67 0.06*** 
(0.49) (0.47) (0.02) 
Knows the location of a pharmacy 0.82 0.79 -0.03* 
 (0.39) (0.41) (0.02) 
Knows the location of Posyandu 0.23 0.24 0.01 
 (0.42) (0.43) (0.02) 
    
Number of observations 672 5229 5901 
    
Notes: The numbers are means. The numbers in parentheses in columns 1 and 2 are standard deviations; 
the numbers in parentheses in column 3 are standard errors. Expenditure on clothes and meat in Panel A 
are in millions of Indonesian Rupiah. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively.  
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Table A2. Other measures of firm performance 
Dependent variable (in logarithm) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Equipment assets      
Askeskin (1) -0.76*** -0.42** -0.25 -0.25 
  (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) 
Deaths in the family (2) -0.14 0.02 -0.20 -0.07 
  (1.12) (1.19) (1.17) (1.19) 
Deaths × Askeskin (3) 3.89*** 2.52* -1.34 -0.61 
  (1.13) (1.37) (1.52) (1.68) 
B. Non-equipment assets      
Askeskin (4) -1.52*** -0.89*** -0.70** -0.67** 
  (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Deaths in the family (5) 0.21 -0.51 -0.34 -1.24 
  (1.50) (1.54) (1.50) (1.48) 
Deaths × Askeskin (6) -1.43 -0.08 -3.99* -3.06 
  (1.53) (1.95) (2.32) (2.43) 
C. Assets purchased      
Askeskin (7) -0.48* -0.42 -0.17 -0.17 
  (0.28) (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) 
Deaths in the family (8) 0.27 0.55 1.29 1.39 
  (1.45) (1.59) (1.86) (1.93) 
Deaths × Askeskin (9) -1.37 -2.01 -3.33 -2.86 
  (1.50) (1.86) (2.27) (2.40) 
D. Assets sold      
Askeskin (10) -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 
  (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) 
Deaths in the family (11) -0.34** -0.31 -0.24 -0.19 
  (0.17) (0.20) (0.21) (0.25) 
Deaths × Askeskin (12) 0.47* 0.08 0.20 0.55 
  (0.26) (0.50) (0.61) (0.69) 
      
Observations  5,851 5,783 5,649 5,519 
Control variables:      
Household characteristics  . ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Firm characteristics  . . ✓ ✓ 
Owner characteristics; 
knowledge of health facilities 
 . . . ✓ 
Notes: The numbers in each column are the estimates of OLS regressions of the measures of firm 
performance on Askeskin, deaths in the family in the previous year, and the interaction between Askeskin 
and deaths in the family, without (column 1) and with control variables (columns 2-4). All regressions 
include district dummies and the dummies for other insurance held by the households. The sample 
excludes two groups of individuals: (i) those who lost Askeskin in 2006, 2007, or 2008; and (ii) those who 
enrolled in Askeskin in 2008. Deaths in the family equal one if at least one family member died in the 
previous year and zero otherwise. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered by 
districts. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A3. Using micro firms with fewer than ten workers 
Dependent variable (in logarithm) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Deaths in the family in the previous years   
Dependent variable: Assets      
Askeskin (1) -1.04*** -0.62*** -0.45** -0.47** 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) 
Deaths in the family (2) -0.91 -0.85 -0.93 -1.24 
  (1.28) (1.37) (1.37) (1.41) 
Deaths × Askeskin (3) 4.65*** 3.59** 0.3 2.01 
  (1.29) (1.53) (1.63) (1.72) 
Dependent variable: Net profits      
Askeskin (4) -0.39*** -0.24** -0.22** -0.26** 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) 
Deaths in the family (5) -0.25 0 -0.04 0.07 
  (0.46) (0.46) (0.36) (0.38) 
Deaths × Askeskin (6) 2.02*** 1.51*** 0.96 1.32* 
  (0.47) (0.58) (0.66) (0.74) 
B. Outpatient care      
Dependent variable: Assets      
Askeskin (7) -1.36*** -0.90*** -0.75*** -0.78*** 
  (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.29) 
Outpatient care (8) -0.17 -0.25 -0.46*** -0.51*** 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Outpatient care × Askeskin (9) 0.83** 0.73* 0.81** 0.85** 
  (0.39) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41) 
Dependent variable: Net profits      
Askeskin (10) -0.55*** -0.38** -0.40** -0.43*** 
  (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) 
Outpatient care (11) -0.11 -0.14 -0.18** -0.18** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Outpatient care × Askeskin (12) 0.40* 0.37* 0.46** 0.43** 
  (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) 
Number of observations  5,781 5,713 5,579 5,450 
      
Notes: The numbers in each column are the estimates of OLS regressions of assets or net profits on 
Askeskin, a measure of family hardships, and the interaction between Askeskin and family hardships, 
without (column 1) and with control variables (columns 2-4). All regressions include district dummies 
and the dummies for other insurance held by the households. The sample excludes two groups of 
individuals: (i) those who lost Askeskin in 2006, 2007, or 2008; and (ii) those who enrolled in Askeskin in 
2008. In Panel A, deaths in the family equal one if at least one family member died in the previous year 
and zero otherwise. In Panel B, outpatient care equals one if a household had at least one family member 
had outpatient care in the previous month and zero otherwise. The adjusted-R2 in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 
are 0.06, 0.07, 0.16, and 0.16, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, 
clustered by districts. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table A4. Using micro firms with assets below Rp 50 million  
Dependent variable (in logarithm) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Deaths in the family in the previous years   
Dependent variable: Assets      
Askeskin (1) -0.83*** -0.55** -0.38* -0.41* 
  (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) 
Deaths in the family (2) -0.99 -1.12 -0.88 -1.14 
  (1.32) (1.37) (1.44) (1.48) 
Deaths × Askeskin (3) 5.21*** 3.78** 0.59 2.45 
  (1.33) (1.52) (1.70) (1.85) 
Dependent variable: Net profits      
Askeskin (4) -0.35*** -0.23* -0.23** -0.28*** 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) 
Deaths in the family (5) -0.40 -0.17 -0.24 -0.15 
  (0.43) (0.44) (0.33) (0.36) 
Deaths × Askeskin (6) 2.29*** 1.49*** 0.98* 1.29** 
  (0.45) (0.57) (0.55) (0.63) 
B. Outpatient care      
Dependent variable: Assets      
Askeskin (7) -1.14*** -0.82*** -0.67** -0.68** 
  (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.29) 
Outpatient care (8) -0.18 -0.22 -0.44*** -0.47*** 
  (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Outpatient care × Askeskin (9) 0.79** 0.70* 0.79** 0.77* 
  (0.39) (0.41) (0.39) (0.41) 
Dependent variable: Net profits      
Askeskin (10) -0.46*** -0.32* -0.35** -0.38** 
  (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) 
Outpatient care (11) -0.07 -0.08 -0.14 -0.14 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Outpatient care × Askeskin (12) 0.27 0.24 0.32 0.27 
  (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) 
Number of observations  5,420 5,360 5,236 5,113 
      
Notes: The numbers in each column are the estimates of OLS regressions of assets or net profits on 
Askeskin, a measure of family hardships, and the interaction between Askeskin and family hardships, 
without (column 1) and with control variables (columns 2-4). All regressions include district dummies 
and the dummies for other insurance held by the households. The sample excludes two groups of 
individuals: (i) those who lost Askeskin in 2006, 2007, or 2008; and (ii) those who enrolled in Askeskin in 
2008. In Panel A, deaths in the family equal one if at least one family member died in the previous year 
and zero otherwise. In Panel B, outpatient care equals one if a household had at least one family member 
had outpatient care in the previous month and zero otherwise. The adjusted-R2 in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 
are 0.06, 0.07, 0.16, and 0.16, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, 
clustered by districts. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
